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Religious Symbols and the
Establishment Clause
NEAL DEVINS

On

5 March 1984, the United States Supreme Court upheld
(five to four) as constitutional the city of Pawtucket, Rhode
Island's Christmas display of the nativity scene. This decision,
Lynch v. Donnelly, 1 once again, points to the inherent problems
of the government's attempting to recognize America's religious
heritage without infringing on the Bill of Rights' mandate that
church and state remain separate.
Lynch raises a number of questions concerning the manner in
which the government may constitutionally involve itself with
the display of explicitly religious objects: Can it subsidize the
display of such objects? Does it matter whether the object is part
of some larger "secular" display? Should the prominence of the
display or the proximity of the display to some religious holiday
be considered legally relevant? Must the government indicate on
the display that its motivation is nonreligious? Must the religious
object be sufficiently connected to the "secular" culture as to
make meaningless the display's religious significance?
These questions are of constitutional significance because the
First Amendment of the Constitution provides, in part, that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion." This prohibition was made applicable to the actions of
state governments through the Fourteenth Amendment in a
1940 Supreme Court decision, Cantwell v. Connecticut. 2
Courts vary in their analysis of government efforts either to
accommodate or to recognize specific religious beliefs. Although
much of religion-particularly the Christmas holidays and religious symbols such as the dove-has become part of mainstream
"secular" society, government efforts to make religious symbols
NEAL DEVINS (A.B., Georgetown University; J.D., Vanderbilt University School of
Law) is an attorney with the United States Commission on Civil Rights. The views expressed
in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission. His articles have appeared in Notre Dame Law Re<Uiew, Vanderbilt Law Re<Uiew, William
and Mary Law Re<Uiew, and Harvard Journal on Legislation. His special interests include
church and state, civil rights, and education.
1. Lynch v. Donnelly, I 04 S.Ct. 1355 (1984).
2. Cantwe//v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
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more visible raises troublesome issues under the Establishment
Clause. Clearly, the state cannot advance one type of religious
belief to the disadvantage of other beliefs. The display of religious symbols cannot be couched in neutral terms as can aid to
(overwhelmingly religious and predominantly Catholic) private
schools. At the same time, it is not inconceivable that a religious
symbol may have an intrinsic secular meaning. For example, a
Christmas tree and Santa Claus are commonly associated with a
time of year and not a set of religious beliefs.
What, however, should be done with a publicly funded display
of outwardly religious symbols such as the nativity scene or the
cross? A display of such objects can be viewed as impermissible
governmental approval of a particular type of religious belief.
Such public displays, however, are frequently thought of as being
cultural symbols and not statements of religious belief. How
then should a court resolve a constitutional challenge to a publicly funded display of an outwardly religious symbol?
On the one hand, society should not become so secularized as
to exclude any reference to this country's religious heritage. On
the other hand, government monies used to advance one particular kind of religious belief might be the principal evil that the
Establishment Clause sought to forestall.
Case law on the religious symbol issue is quite inconclusive
and frequently at odds with itself. Aside from the nativity scene
controversy, this issue has generally arisen in four contextsnamely, postings of the Ten Commandments, displays of the
cross, celebration of religious events, and some recognition of
religious heritage such as appeals to God printed on items made
available to the public through the government. The results in
this group of cases are quite mixed and, thus, pointed to the
need for the Supreme Court to resolve the religious symbols
ISSUe.

Lynch v. Donnelly, however, evidenced an insensitivity on the
part of the justices to minority non-Christian views about religious symbols such as the nativity scene. In Lynch, the Court
virtually ignored the pervasively religious message conveyed by
the nativity scene. Instead of balancing the creche's traditional
or historical value against its religious value, the Court simply
characterized the nativity scene as a secular display. Such characterization ignores both the significant religious value of the
creche to Christians and the plain fact that the Pawtucket display might have the effect of alienating non-Christians. Additionally, the Lynch majority failed to explicate in a principled
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manner the standards of judicial review to be utilized in Establishment Clause cases.
THE EsTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

The standard of review most commonly utilized in Establishment Clause decisions is the so-called tripartite test. This test
provides that for a legislative enactment to pass constitutional
muster, the statute "must have a secular legislative purpose,"
"its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion," and, finally, "the statute must not
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion." 3 If
any one of these three elements is not satisfied, the statute will
be found unconstitutional.
Although easily stated, the application of this three-pronged
test has been mystifying. The Court itself noted that "in many
of these decisions we have expressly or implicitly acknowledged
that we can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this
extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutionallaw."4 In a similar
vein, the Court has recognized the limited precedential value of
its Establishment Clause decisions: "Establishment clause cases
are not easy; they stir deep feelings; and we are divided among
ourselves.... What is certain is that our decisions have tended
to avoid categorical imperatives and absolutist approaches to
either end of the range of possible outcomes. This course sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibility."S Consequently, although the tripartite test "is well settled, our cases have also
emphasized that it provides 'no more than [a] helpful signpost'
in dealing with establishment clause challenges."6 Recent Establishment Clause decisions suggest that the tripartite test has itself
become "unhelpful. "7
In its 1983 Marsh v. Chambers8 decision, for example, the
Supreme Court devised a historical exemption to the tripartite
test. Marsh upheld the state of Nebraska's practice of beginning
each session of its state legislature with a prayer by a chaplain
paid and approved by the state legislature. In upholding this
practice, the Court declined, without explanation, to apply the
3. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
4. Ibid.
5. Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646,662 (1980).
6. Huntv. McNair, 413 U.S. 734,741 (1973).
7. See, e.g., Neal Devins, "Inconsistent Standards of Review in Last Term's Establishment
Cases," National Law Journal 3 (October 1983):22.
8. Mar.sh v. Chambers, 103 S.Ct. 3330 {1983).
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tripartite test. 9 Instead, the Court based its decision solely upon
the fact that the first Congress had a paid legislative chaplain.
The Court felt that the first Congress would have been acutely
aware of the meaning of the Establishment Clause since they
crafted it. Had the Court applied contemporary Establishment
Clause standards, however, they undoubtedly would have found
the legislative chaplain unconstitutional. As 1ustice William 1.
1
Brennan, 1r. noted in his powerful dissent: "That the purpose'
of the legislative prayer is preeminently religious rather than
secular seems to me to be self-evident.... I have no doubt that,
if any group of law students were asked to apply the tripartite
test, to legislative prayer, they would nearly unanimously find
the practice to be unconstitutional."lO
Marsh was the first Establishment Clause decision to make
explicit use of the historical exemption.ll The notion, however,
that religious practices deeply embedded in this history/tradition
are beyond the purview of judicial review would appear to apply
to several other situations. Examples of this range from the "In
God We Trust" motto printed on U.S. currency to the singing
of Christmas carols in public schools to possibly publicly funded
displays of the nativity scene.12
A second exception to the tripartite standard was carved out
by the Supreme Court in their 1982 decision, Larson v. Valente. 13
Larson invalidated a Minnesota statute that exempted religious
organizations from Charitable Solicitations Act requirements provided that more than half of their total contributions derive from
church members or affiliated organizations. Apparently, this legislation was drafted in order to impose reporting requirements
on so-called "cult religions" such as the Unification Church and
the Hare Krishnas. Instead of nullifying this enactment on the
grounds that its purpose and/or effect was to (dis)favor certain
religious organizations, the Court required Minnesota to demonstrate that its enactment was the least restrictive means available
9. The Eighth United States Circuit Court of Appeals had applied the tripartite standard
and held that the chaplain provision violated all three elements ofthe test. Chamber.rv. Marsh,
675 F.2d 229 (8th Cir. 1982).
10. Marsh v. Chamber.r, at 3338-40 Qustice Brennan dissenting).
11. Other Court decisions have made use of history to support their conclusions. For
example, in Walz v. Tax Commission, a 1969 decision that upheld New York's practice of
granting property tax exemptions to religious and other social welfare organizations, the
Court emphasized both the historical roots and apparent beneficient effects of this practice.
For the Court: "A page of history is worth a volume of logic" (397 U.S. 664, 676 [1969]).
12. Alternatively, Marsh could be read narrowly to apply only to practices adopted by the
First Congress. See note 126.
13. Lar.ron v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).

RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS AND ESTABLISHMENT

23

to attain some compelling state interest-a burden that the state
failed to meet. The Court argued that application of this compelling interest-least restrictive means test was appropriate since
the Minnesota statute "makes explicit and deliberate distinctions
between religious organizations." 14
Larson, when issued, was considered by some courts to apply
to governmental action that either benefited or regulated religion
in an uneven manner. 15 Consequently, although Larson concerned a discriminatory regulatory scheme, its principle conceivably could extend to the uneven granting of government benefits
to religion. Under this interpretation, government displays of
religious symbols would invoke the Larson test since benefits
would extend only to those religions associated with the symbols
on display.
In addition to these two deviations from the tripartite test, the
Supreme Court's application of the tripartite standard has been
incredibly uneven. Apparently, the Court will craft its application of the tripartite standard to suit its desired outcome. Two
cases decided in the Court's 1982-83 term, Mueller v. Allen and
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, support this contention. 16
In Mueller v. Allen, the Court upheld (five to four) a Minnesota tuition tax deduction scheme that permitted parents of public
and private schoolchildren to deduct expenses incurred in providing "tuition, textbooks, and transportation" for their children.
Noting that "at this point in the 20th Century we are quite far
removed from the dangers that prompted the framers to include
the establishment clause in the Bill of Rights," 17 the Court
refused to consider the actual effect of the Minnesota program.l 8
Instead, Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the Court, contended: "We would be loathe to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting
the extent to which various classes of private citizens claimed
benefits under the law." 19 In fact, the Mueller majority recognized that "the economic consequences of the program in [cases
14. Ibid., at 247, n. 23.
15. See, e.g., American CivilLiberties UnionofGeorgiav. Rabun County ChamberofCommerce,
698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983); Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1983).
16. See Devins, "Inconsistent Standards of Review"; Mueller v. Allen, 103 S.Ct. 3062
(1983); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 1035 S.Ct. 505 (1982).
17. Mueller v. Allen, at 3069, quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977) Qustice
Powell concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18. For a detailed analysis of Mueller and its impact on government efforts to aid private
schools, see Neal Devins, "The Supreme Court and Private Schools. An Update," Thi.r World
8 (Spring 1984):13.
19. Mueller v. Allen, at 3070.
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where the Court invalidated the government program] and that
in this case may be difficult to distinguish."ZO Under this "deferential" analytical standard, the Court was able to conclude that
the Minnesota program satisfied all three elements of the tripartite test.
The Mueller ruling is difficult to square with Larkin v. Grendel'.r Den. ZI In Larkin, the Court invalidated, by an eight-to-one
margin, a Massachusetts statute that vested in the governing
bodies of schools and churches the power to prevent the issuance
of liquor licenses for premises within a radius of five hundred
feet of the church or school. In so doing, the Court approved the
application of strict standards of the variety rejected by the
Mueller Court, namely: Laws "with only a remote and incidental
effect advantageous to religious institutions" can pass constitutional muster.ZZ Similarly, the Larkt'n Court rejected the proposition advanced in Mueller that "the risk of significant religious or
denominational control over our democratic processes-or even
of deep political division along religious lines-is remote. "23
Instead, the Larkt'n Court approved of the Jeffersonian "wall of
separation'' between church and state metaphor holding that
"under our system the choice has been made that government is
to be entirely excluded from the area of religious instruction and
churches excluded from the affairs of government. The Constitution
demands that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice, and that
while some involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines
must be drawn."Z 4 For the Court, "The Framers did not set up
a system of government in which important, discretionary govern20. Ibid., at 3067, n. 6, 3068. Mueller, thus, represents a substantial change in Establishment
Clause analysis from a group of early and mid-1970s decisions that severely restricted state
effons to aid private schools. In Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, for example, the
Court invalidated a New York statute that, in part, provided tuition reimbursement for
low-income parents of children attending nonpublic elementary or secondary schools; 413
u.s. 756 (1973).
Writing for the majority,Justice Lewis F. Powell stressed that the Court would look at the
actual effects of the enactment instead of accepting as true the legislature's finding of secular
effect. Consequently, the Court found irrelevant the fact that parents received the reimbursement, not private schools: "If the grants are offered as an incentive to parents to send their
children to sectarian schools by making unrestricted cash payments to them, the establishment clause is violated whether or not the actual dollars given eventually find their way into
the sectarian institutions. Whether the grant is labeled a reimbursement, a reward, or a
subsidy, its substantive impact is still the same" (ibid., at 786 [emphasis supplied]).
21. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, at 505.
22. Ibid., at 4026, quoting Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, at 756, 783 n. 39.
23. Mueller v. Allen, at 3062, 3069, quoting Wolman v. Walter, at 263 Oustice Powell
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
24. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, at 505, 512, quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, at 602, 625 (1971}.
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mental powers would be delegated to or shared with religious
institutions. ''25
Taken together, Larkin and Mueller suggest that the Supreme
Court has available to it two tripartite tests-one is a deferential
test used to uphold government programs and the other is a
strict scrutiny test used to invalidate such programs. Recent
Supreme Court decisions suggest that the Court will make increasing use of the deferential test. 26 At the time of the Lynch
decision, however, it was unclear as to whether the Court would
make use of the tripartite test and, if the Court utilized the tripartite test, whether it would apply a deferential or strict standard of review.
RELIGIOUS SYMBOL CASE LAw

Prior to Lynch, judicial rule making on the religious symbol
issue was quite inconclusive. Aside from the nativity scene controversy, this issue has generally arisen in four contextsnamely, postings of the Ten Commandments, displays of the
cross, celebration of religious events, and some recognition of
this country's religious heritage-such as appeals to Godprinted on items made available to the public through the government. The results in this group of cases are quite mixed and,
thus, pointed to the need for the Supreme Court to resolve the
religious symbols issue.27
THE TEN COMMANDMENTS

Three federal court decisions over the past ten years have been
concerned with government displays of the Ten Commandments.
In Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 28 the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the city's maintenance on courthouse
grounds of an illuminated "3 X 5 foot granite monolith inscribed with a version of the Ten Commandments and certain
other symbols representing the All Seeing Eye of God, the Star
25. Ibid., at 512.
26. See Devins, "The Supreme Court and Private Schools: An Update."
27. One decision that loosely fits into the "religion symbol" category-but is not
worthy of textual discussion-is Goldstein v. Fire Department of the Village of Suffern, New
York, 559 F. Supp. 1289 {SONY 1983). Goldstein summarily invalidated the fire department's posting of a sign that read, "Keep Christ in Christmas." The court followed the
so-called Schempp rule that government "'may not employ religious means to reach a
secular goal unless secular means are wholly unavailable"' (ibid., at 1389, quoting Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 Uustice Brennan concurring] [1962]).
28. Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 475 F.2d 29 (lOth Cir. 1973).
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of David ... and Christ of Peace."29 The circuit court reasoned
that although the monument "is at once religious and secular,
... it does not seem reasonable to require removal of a passive
monument, involving no compulsion, because its accepted precepts, as a foundation for law, reflect the religious nature of an
ancient era .... The wholesome neutrality guaranteed by the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses does not dictate obliteration of all our religious traditions."JO
This spirit of benev.olent neutrality was absent in two other
cases concerning the placement of the Ten Commandments in
the public schools. In Ring v. Grand Forks Public District,ll the
North Dakota district court invalidated a state law that required
each school district to "cause a placard containing the Ten
Commandments of the Christian religion to be displayed in a
conspicious place in every school. "32 The state argued that "the
Ten Commandments, although biblical in origin, are the cornerstone of our legal system and thus have become secular in
nature."JJ The court rejected this argument since the first three
of the Ten Commandments are explicitly religious. The reasoning of the Ring court was adopted by the Supreme Court in Stone
v. Grahm,H a case involving similar facts and issues. In Stone,
the Court invalidated a Kentucky statute requiring the posting
of a copy of the Ten Commandments, purchased with private
contributions, on the wall of each public school classroom in the
state. Although the state required that each plaque contain a
printed notation that the Commandments serve as the fundamental legal code of Western civilization, the Court viewed the
Commandments as plainly religious and, thus, concluded that
the posting served no constitutional educational function. The
Court also held that "it does not matter that the posted copies of
the Ten Commandments are financed by voluntary private contributions, for the mere posting of the copies under the auspices
of the legislature provides the 'official support of the state ... '
that the Establishment Clause prohibits."JS
Stone, by viewing the Commandments as purely religious, calls
into question the Tenth Circuit's characterization of the Commandments in Anderson. Moreover, "Stone, has been read as
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Ibid., at 30.
Ibid., at 33-34.
Ringv. Grand Fork.r PublicDi.rtrict, 483 F.Supp. 272 (D.N.D. 1980).
Ibid., at 273.
Ibid., at 274.
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
Ibid., at 42, quoting Abington v. Schempp, at 203, 222.
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permitting a court to infer a nonsecular purpose from government involvement with a symbol or instrument it has determined to be patently religious."36 Considering the inextricably
religious message of the first three commandments, the holdings
in Stone and Ring seem correct. 37
THE CROSS

Five state court decisions and two federal court rulings, ranging over a fifteen-year period, have addressed the constitutionality of public displays of the cross. The apparent subjectivity and
unpredictability of these cases are evidenced by two decisions of
the Oregon Supreme Court concerning the same public display.
In 1969, that court held in Lowe v. City of Eugene3 8 the issuance
of a retroactive building permit to a private party for the erection
of a cross (already built) on a municipal park that overlooked the
city. The court initially held that the cross was a religious symbol. The court then held that the cross served an impermissible
religious purpose since it was "lighted" at Christmas and at
Easter. In response to that ruling, a charter amendment was
approved by the city accepting as a gift the cross as a "memorial
or monument to United States war veterans." The Oregon
Supreme Court upheld this gift in 1976 in Eugene Sand and
Gravel v. City of Eugene. 39 Although recognizing that the cross
was still a religious symbol and its display very prominent, the
court concluded that it served a primarily secular function in the
context of a war memorial. The court also noted that a plaque
describing the cross as a tribute to veterans was placed next to
the cross; and that the cross was lit only "on appropriate days or
seasons which fittingly represent the patriotic sacrifice of war
veterans.'' 40
The display of crosses was also approved in two other decisions. In the 1967 Paul v. Dade County41 decision, the Florida
36. Jill Vutter Fuchs, "Publicly-Funded Display of Religious Symbols: TheNativity Scene
Controversy," University of Cincinnati Law Review 51 (1982):353, 363.
37. Significantly, Stone and Ring do not absolutely prohibit public display of the Commandments. Instead, these cases demand that the Commandments be presented in such a way
as not to connote government approval of the Commandments' religious message. For
example, the Commandments could be displayed in a museum exhibit concerning the history
of Western civilization.
38. Lowe v. City ofEugene, 463 P.2d 360 (Or. 1969).
39. Eugene Sand and Gravelv. City ofEugene, 558 P.2d 338 (Or. 1976).
40. Ibid., at 344. The court probably would have approved of the cross being lit during the
Christmas season and on such holidays as Memorial Day, Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day,
and Independence Day.
41. Paul v. Dade County, 202 So. 2nd 833 (Fla. 1967).
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Court of Appeals upheld the display of a cross at the Miami
courthouse. This decision was incomplete, however, since the
court failed to determine whether the display had a religious
effect. In 1972, the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the display of a fifty-foot cross-erected by a local coalition of churchesat a city fair.42 The court reasoned that the cross could not have
a religious effect since it was displayed "in a distinctly secular
environment in the midst of persons in pursuit of distinctively
secular entertainment."43 The Oklahoma court paid no attention
to either the prominence of the display or the religiosity of the
cross.
The California Supreme Court viewed the public display of
the cross in a different fashion when it invalidated Los Angeles's
authorization of illumination of a huge cross on city hall to
honor the Christmas and Easter holidays. This 1978 decision,
Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 44 viewed the city's practice as religious
favoritism. For the court, "The city hall is not an immense bulletin board whereon symbols of all faith could be thumbtacked
or otherwise displayed .... To illuminate only the Latin cross
does seem preferential when comparable recognition of other
religious symbols is impractical."4S
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals also disapproved of a
public display of the cross in their 1983 decision, American Civil
Liberties Union of Georgia v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce. 46
Rabun concerned the constitutionality of a state-approved, illuminated twenty-six feet by thirty-five feet cross in Black Rock
Mountain State Park. Although erected and maintained (through
funds provided by area churches) by the local chamber of commerce, the federal appellate court held that the placement of the
cross on public land violated the Establishment Clause. Central
to this ruling was a press release issued by the chamber that
suggested that the chamber's purpose was to advance the Christian religion. The release stated in part: "The cross is a symbol
of Christianity for millions of people in this great nation and the
world. "47 Based on this release and the failure of the chamber to
proffer a plausible "secular purpose" for the display, the appellate court concluded that the state of Georgia had an affirmative
42. Meyer v. Oklahoma City, 496 P. 2d 789 (Okl. 1972).
43. Ibid., at 792.
44. Fox v. City ofLos .Angeles, !50 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1968).
45. Ibid., at 869.
46. .American CiviiLiberti'es Um"onofGeorgia v. Rabun County C/zambtrofCommrrce, 698 F.2d
1098 (11th Cir. 1983).
47. Ibid., at llOl.
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obligation to remove the cross.
Another federal court, however, ruled that in certain instances
the public display of the cross is constitutional. In the 1981 Johnson v. Board of County Commissioners of Bernalillo County 48 decision, the United States District Court for New Mexico upheld
the county's inclusion of the cross on the county seal. Noting
that Catholicism was the state church at the time of Bernalillo
County's origin, the district court concluded "that the cross in
the seal represents the Spanish and Catholic traditions of early
New Mexico and of Bernalillo County."49
Bernalillo County seems properly decided. The Catholic Church
played a significant role in the development of America's Southwest. Public recognition of this role provides no more than a
permissible remote and incidental benefit to religion. At the
same time, it is hard to accept the upholding of the public display of the cross in any other of these cases. The display of the
crosses in Fox, Paul, and Lowe were all tied to a religious holiday. A cross at a war memorial, as in Eugene Sand, is arguably
"nonreligious." The prominence of the location and the suspicious change in the use of the Eugene cross, however, makes
problematic the Eugene Sand holding. Finally, the size and sponsorship of the cross in the Oklahoma and Georgia cases also
suggests that those displays had the purpose and effect of advancing religion.
RELIGIOUS HERITAGE

Three federal court decisions have been issued concerning
government recognition of America's monotheistic JudeaChristian heritage. These cases raise the issue of whether and
when it is appropriate for government to recognize explicitly
that religion is a part of that culture and that Americans believe
in God. Courts generally accommodate government practices
which recognize that, as Justice Douglas said, "we are a religious people." 50 In the 1967 Americans United for Separation of
Church and State v. O'Brien,Sl the Washington, D.C. District
Court upheld the Post Office Department's issuance of a commemorative Christmas postage stamp reproducing in miniature
48. Johnson v. Board of County Commi.r.rionersojBema/il/o County, 528 F.Supp. 919 (D.N.M.
1981).
49. Ibid., at 924.
50. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,313 (1952).
51. Americans UmiedforSeparati'onojCizurclzandStatev. O'Brien, 272 F.Supp. 712 (D.D.C.
1967).
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Hans Memling's famous painting of "Madonna and Child with
Angels." Recognizing that the stamp replication was "a design
of religious significance," the court, however, summarily concluded that to suggest that the replication was "a form of proselytizing, is as remote and far-fetched as to be entitled to but
scant consideration."52 In many respects, the court's analysis was
premised on the belief that "religion is an inherent, permeating
and pervading strain of our national life. It would be impossible
to disarray, sever, or prevent every connection and every contact
between religion and government, or to extricate every trace and
vestige of religion from government." 53
Another case where the courts utilized America's religious
heritage as a basis for upholding the government's recognition of
religious belief was the 1970 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision in Arnow v. United States. 54 Arnow upheld the inscription of "In God We Trust" on United States currency. The
Arnow court simply held that the motto's "use is of a patriotic or
ceremonial character and bears no true resemblance to a governmental sponsorship of a religious exercise." 55
Unlike the recognition of this religious heritage, when government advocation of a present belief in God is at issue, courts
universally find such practices unconstitutional. In the context
of religious symbolism, this issue was raised in a 1980 Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Hall v. Bradshaw. 56 Hall concerned the North Carolina Department of Transportation's printing of a "motorist's prayer" on a state map published and distributed free of charge by the department. This prayer began,
"Our heavenly Father, we ask this day a particular blessing as
we take the wheel of our car,"57 and continued predictably
therefrom. The Hall court concluded that the printing of this
prayer clearly had the impermissible effect of promoting a particular brand of religious belief. For the court: "By printing a
prayer on the official map, the state is placing its power and
support behind a particular form of theological belief, and state
sponsorship of religious belief is one of the primary encroachments the [Establishment] clause seeks to inhibit.... The state
necessarily offends the sensibilities of [both] non-believers [and]
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Ibid., at 721.
Ibid., at 719.
Arnow v. United StaU.t, 432 F.Zd 242 (9th Cir. 1970).
Ibid., at 243.
Hallv. Bradshaw, 630 F.Zd 1018 (4th Cir. 1980).
Ibid., at 1019.
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devout believers among the citizenry who regard prayer 'as a
necessarily private experience.' "ss
These three cases all seem properly resolved. Considering the
clear denominational association with the Madonna, 0 'Brien was
a tougher case than the district court let on. America's religious
tradition, however-as reflected in many of the great works of
art housed in museums-suggests that the district court was justified in its holding. Arnow and Hall were not closed questions.
The "In God We Trust" motto is of historical and cultural
value. It neither encourages nor discourages religious practice.
The opposite can be said of North Carolina's highway prayer.
That prayer is an active call for a specified type of religious
practice.
RELIGIOUS EVENTS

Government's erection of a religious symbol for temporary
display in order to facilitate the observance of a religious event
on public property was disapproved by the courts in the one case
that directly raised this issue. In the 1980 Gifi//an v. City of Phi'/ade/phia59 decision, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated
the city of Philadelphia's efforts to assume the cost of a papal
mass at Philadelphia's Logan Circle. The city, in addition to
crowd control and other related expenses, "expended a gross
total of $310,741 to construct and prepare the Papal platform.
The platform was designed with the approval of the Archdiocese
of Philadelphia, by staff architects employed by the city .... A
thirty-six foot high Christian cross was constructed on the main
platform and was lighted at the city's expense a week before the
Pope's arrival. By special order of the mayor, the cross and platform remained in place for over two weeks after the mass.'' 60
A divided panel of the third circuit court concluded that the
58. Ibid., at 1020-21, quoting .Abington v. Schempp, at 203, 285 (1962) Qustice Brennan
concurring).
59. Gijillan "· Cziy of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924 (3rd Cir. 1980). Giftllan did not hold that
public property could not be used for religious purposes. America's religious heritage clearly
supports the granting of gm·ernment permits to religious (and nonreligious) organizations on
a nondiscriminatory basis. See, e.g., Baird"· White, 476 F.Supp. 442 (D. Mass. 1979)
upholding the city of Boston's granting to the local archdiocese control of an area adjacent to
the altar on Boston Common where the pope would celebrate a papal Mass; O'Hair v.
.Andrews, 613 F.Zd 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979) upholding Department of Interior expenditures for
park police services in relation to a papal Mass given on the public national mall located in
Washington, D.C.
60. Theodore H. Smith, "Separation of Church and State, a Reaffirmation," Temple Law
Quarterly 54 (1981):930, 932.
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city's actions violated all three prongs of the Establishment
Clause test. The secular purpose and secular effect requirements
were not satisfied since the platform was specially designed for
the celebration of Holy Mass by the pope. 6I Additionally, the
joint planning of the Mass by the city and the archdiocese
created impermissible excessive entanglement between the city
and the church. A dissenting opinion was filed by Judge Aldisert
that argued, in part, that the papal Mass was a secular event
since the pope is head of a secular state.
The third circuit ruling was a proper response to the city's
overzealous effort to share with the archdiocese in the promotion
and celebration of the papal Mass. Considering the explicitly
religious nature of the Mass, the city's activities must be construed as impermissible government sponsorship of religion.
THE NATIVITY ScENE CoNTROVERSY

Lynch v. Donnelly presented the Supreme Court with an bpportunity to set up an analytical standard for future judicial review
of this type of case. Lynch raises two issues essential to the resolution of a "religious symbol" case, namely: whether and when
some object associated with both secular and religious events is
religious, and whether and when a religious object can convey a
predominantly secular meaning. Lynch also called into question
the viability of the tripartite test for Establishment Clause review.
As shall be demonstrated, the Supreme Court's Lynch decision
provided very little in the way of definitive clarification of either
of these issues. At the same time, the tenor of the Court's opinion comes perilously close to endorsing an approach to Establishment Clause adjudication that would uphold most government benefits to (all or select) religions. Apparently, government
would have to vest political decision-making authority in religious institutions to violate the Establishment Clause. 6Z
Any object closely tied to some religious holiday, practice, or
belief should be defined as religious. This was the message con61. The city had asserted that these expenditures served a valuable public relations function.
The appellate court flatly rejected this contention, noting that: "By so arguing, the City
places itself in a difficult position. Viewers of the ceremony that do not know of the citysponsorship are likely to believe only that the Archdiocese, not the City, made a special effort.
The Archdiocese, not the City, will receive the public relations 'bonanza.' But if the city
sponsorship is known, that aid connotes state approval of a particular religion, one of the
specific evils the Establishment Clause was designed to prevent" (637 F.2d 924-, 930 [3rd Cir.
1980]).
62. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, at 505.
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veyed by the Supreme Court in Abington School District v.
Schempp, 63 Engel v. Vitale, 64 and Stone v. Graham. 65 These decisions suggest that the nativity scene will be viewed as clearly
religious and, thus, trigger Establishment Clause review. Schempp
held unconstitutional Bible reading in the public schools. Engel
similarly invalidated nondenominational school prayer. In both
cases, the Court viewed the Bible as an inherently religious
instrument and, thus, concluded that the school programs violated the Establishment Clause since government is " 'utilizing
the prestige, power, and influence' of a public institution to
bring religion into the lives of citizens."66 The Court, however,
did note "that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and
historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such
study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as
part of a secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment."67 Similar to these cases
involving the Bible, the Court in Stone invalidated a Kentucky
statute mandating the posting of the Ten Commandments. The
Court, as mentioned, held that the Commandments were clearly
religious.
63. Abington v. Schempp, at 203.

64. Engelv. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
65. Stone v. Graham, at 39.
66. Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970). But see Florey v. Sioux Falls School
District49-5, 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1980). The Florey Court found constitutional under the
tripartite standard public school Christmas assemblies. The school board claimed that it
supported such programs because "one of its educational goals is to advance the students'
knowledge and appreciation of the role that our religious heritage has played in the social,
cultural and historical development of civilization" (ibid., at 1314). The eighth circuit court,
pointing to language in Engel and Schempp that approved the study-but not practice-of
religion, correctly suggested that the germane question was whether a genuine "secular
program of education is furthered by the [program]" (ibid., at 1316). The eighth circuit court
answered this question in the affirmative: "Only holidays with both religious and secular
bases may be observed; music, art, literature and drama may be included in the curriculum
only if presented in a prudent and objective manner and only as a part of the cultural and
religious heritage of the holiday; and religious symbols may be used only as a teaching aid or
resource and only if they are displayed as a part of the cultural and religious heritage of the
holiday and are temporary in nature. Since all programs and materials authorized by the rules
must deal with the secular or cultural basis or heritage of the holidays and since the materials
must be presented in a prudent and objective manner and symbols used as a teaching aid, the
advancement of a 'secular program of education,' and not of religion, is the primary effect of
the rules" (ibid., at 1317). Although the circuit court based this decision on school district
guidelines and not school practices, Florey seems a proper recognition of the central role that
religion plays in this culture. Key to the eighth circuit ruling was the fact that affirmative steps
would be taken to ensure that students would perceive the Christmas assembly as a cultural
event. The nativity scene display upheld by the Supreme Court, however, did not include any
sort of statement suggesting that the creche's cultural significance was the basis of its
inclusion in the display.
67. Abington v. Schempp, at 203, 225.
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The apparently pervasive religiosity of the nativity scene suggests that a public display of the creche in isolation (and not as
part of some larger seasonal display) would be found unconstitutional. Supportive of this conclusion is McCreary v. Stone,6B a
1983 decision of the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of New York. McCreary upheld the city of Scarsdale,
New York's denial of access to the Scarsdale Creche Committee
of a village-owned park for the purpose of displaying a privately
owned nativity scene. In reaching this decision, the McCreary
court was forced to determine that the public display violated the
Establishment Clause. Otherwise, the city would have improperly limited the Creche Committee's First Amendment freedomof-speech right of equal access to a public forum.69 The McCreary
court, applying the tripartite test, concluded that the display
clearly had the impermissible "primary effect" of advancing the
Christian religion. Central to this ruling was a significant
amount of evidence that suggested that both area residents and
sponsors of the creche considered the display of primarily religious significance. 70
McCreary, although significant, does not speak to the issue
raised in other nativity scene cases, namely, can government
either sponsor or display a creche in the context of purportedly
secularly seasonal display.7I
68. McCreary v. Stone, 575 F.Supp. 1112 (S.D.N. Y. 1983). A nearly identical challenge had
been dismissed in 1977 on procedural grounds. Rubin v. Village ofScarJdale, 440 F.Supp. 607
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
69. McCreary v. Stone, at 1122. The Supreme Court's 1983 decision, Perry Educatt'o11 Auodation v. Perry LocalEducators Association, mandates this conclusion, 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983), Perry
held that in regard to "quintessential public forums [such as streets or parks] ... the state
(may] enforce a content based exclusion [only if] it .•• show(s] that its regulation is necessary
to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end" (ibid., at
955). In McCreary, the city claimed that its "denial [of access] was necessary to serve a
compelling state interest because to allow the erection of the creche on public property would
violate the Establishment Clause" (575 F.Supp. 1112, 1126 [S.D.N.Y. 1983]).
70. Examples include: (I) a statement of the clergy from the Scarsdale churches that noted:
"In keeping with ourrespect for one another's beliefs and in keeping with our government's
position to protect religious freedom without promoting or restricting particular religious
views, we believe that it is inappropriate to use public property to make a religious statement"
(McCreary v. Stone, at 1112, 1118); (2) a significant numberofthose letters received by the city
in opposition to its decision "perceived the problem as one stemming from a difference
between Christians and Jews.... "(ibid., at 1119); and (3) a petition subscribed to by about
eighty or so signatures, stated, "'V nless we are mistaken the United States is regarded by the
world as a Christian country, and the creche is simply a symbol of our Christianity'" (ibid.).
71. Two lower New York State court decisions, however, contradict McCreary :r holding.
See, Baerv. Kolmorgen, 181 N.Y.S. 2d 230 (1958);Lawrencev. Buchmueller, 243 N.Y.S. 2d 87
(1963). Both of these cases, however, were decided prior to the Supreme Court's 1971
adoption of the tripartite test. Additionally, there are apparent analytic defects in both cases.
In Baer, the court effectively eliminated the "secular effect" requirement, noting that "the
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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, relying on the
Supreme Court's ruling in Lynch v. Donnelly, overturned the district court ruling in McCreary. 72 Agreeing with the district
court's determinations that the village-owned park is a traditional public forum, and that the nativity scene display is a form
of speech,73 the appellate court ruled that " 'in order to justify
discriminatory exclusion from a public forum based on the religious content of the group's intended speech, the [City] . . .
must show that its [decision] is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.' " 74 In
light of Lynch, the appellate court concluded that the city could
not justify its prohibition. The fact that the Scarsdale nativity
scene was not part of some larger Christmas display, unlike the
Pawtucket display at issue in Lynch, was considered irrelevant by
the second circuit court. The appellate court argued that "the
Supreme Court did not decide the Pawtucket case based upon
the physical context within which the display of the creche was
situated; rather, the Court consistently referred to 'the creche in
the context of the Christmas season,' or the 'Christmas Holiday
Season.'"75 As noted later,76 the appellate court was accurate in
its characterization of the majority ruling in Lynch. At the same
time, the Supreme Court has agreed to review during this term
the appellate court's decision.
The fact that a nativity scene is labeled religious does not
necessarily mean that the government is absolutely prohibited
from either funding the display of the nativity scene or permitting a private party to erect such a display. In fact, two lower
federal courts have held that displays of the nativity scene on
public grounds do not promote religion. The Washington, D.C.
Court of Appeals held in the 1973 Allen v. Morton 77 decision that
Creche is undoubtedly a religious symbol. In viewing it, however, we are all free to interpret
its meaning according to our own religious faith" (181 N.Y.S. 2d 230, 238 [1958]). In
Lawrence, the state court simply failed to provide any justification for its ruling.
72. McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2nd Cir. 1984).
.
73. Ibid., at 722-23.
74. Ibid., at 723, quoting Widmarv. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,269-70 (1981).
75. Ibid., at 729, quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, at 1355, 1362. The appellate court, however,
required the city to erect a sign stating that the display has been erected and maintained by a
private group; ibid., at 728.
76. See pages 38-45.
77. Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court, however, held the display
unconstitutional since federal participation in the planning of the display constituted excessive governmental entanglement in religious matters. See also A/len v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944
(D.C. Cir. 1970) overturning district court grant of defendant's summary judgment motion
on this issue since "secular effect" question was substantial enough to require district court
resolution.
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the federal government did not promote religion by permitting
the display of an illuminated life-size nativity scene on federal
park land. The Allen court recognized that rc 'aid normally may
be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion . . .
when it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise
essentially secular setting.' "78 The court, however, felt that several other factors spoke to the constitutionality of the display.
First, the display was part of the annual Pageant of Peace-rcan
admittedly secular event whose only 'religious• content is that it
recognizes the religious heritage aspect of Christmas by means
of an admittedly religious symbol."79 Second, explanatory plaques
were placed on the grounds of the pageant that explained both
the secular nature of the pageant and the role of the nativity
scene in such a secular event. Third, government involvement in
the pageant did not include activities relating to the financing,
maintenance, or storage of the nativity scene. The court thus
concluded that the display rcshould not be considered in isolation
but as an integral part of the whole of the [secular] Pageant."BO
These mitigating factors were not present in Citizens Concerned
for Separation of Church and State v. City and County of Denver
II, 81 a 1981 decision of the Colorado district court that upheld a
publicly funded display of a nativity scene on public property.
The key to this decision was the district court's holding that the
nativity scene is not a pervasively religious symbol and consequently the plaintiffs must demonstrate a rc direct and immediate" religious effect. For the court, rcThe nativity scene has
been used sufficiently in secular settings, and has been sufficiently integrated into our nation•s folklore that [its] message
.... [may have] a sign of the holiday season on a par with Santa
and mistletoe."S2 Engel, Schempp, and Stone, by defining the
78. Allen v. Morton, at 72, n. 12, quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973).
79. Ibid., at 74.
80. Ibid. This balancing approach was recently criticized by the district court in McCreary.
According to that court: "[I]f cases such as this were to turn on minutiae like the visibility or
lack of ambiguity of disclaiming signs, the size or relative size of the symbol, the length of
time for the display, or the potentially myriad other factors which possibly could be held to
affect the outcome, the courts would become hopelessly entangled in the problem, and
perhaps more importantly, villages like Scarsdale would endlessly be in and out of court" (575
F. Supp. 1112, 1133 [S.D.N.Y. 1983]).
81. C1iizens ConcemedforSeparation ofChurch andState v. City and County ofDenver II, 526 F.
Supp.1310(D. Colo.1981). ButseeCitizen.rConcemed, 481 F. Supp. 522 (D. Colo.1979)rt"V~
628 F.2d 1289 (lOth Cir. 1980). In the earlier case, the district court enjoined the city from
including the nativity scene in its Christmas display. The tenth circuit reversed, claiming that
plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit. A state constitutional claim on this issue is
presently pending before a state trial court in Colorado. See Conrad v. City and County of
Denver, 659 P.2d 662 (Colo. 1983).
82. Citizens Concemedv. Denver II, at 1310, 1313. To support this claim, the court noted
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Bible and Ten Commandments as pervasively religious, held
that plaintiffs need only demonstrate a "remote and incidental"
effect.
The court in Citizens Concerned II then held that "[the nativity
scene] is part of an overall [secular] Christmas display of traditional Christmas symbols of short duration and is displayed with
equal prominence as such holiday favorites as Santa and Rudolph."83 Finally, the Citizens Concerned II court disregarded testimony by psychologists and Denver residents that they considered the display religious, holding that "the First Amendment
does not require the prerogatives of government [to] be limited
by the sensibilities of its most sensitive or fastidious citizens. "84
Ironically, the Colorado district court had earlier ruled in a
nearly identical case that the display of the Denver creche violated the Establishment Clause. This 1979 decision, Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church and State v. City and County of
Denver I, 85 was overturned on jurisdictional grounds in 1980 by
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.86 The district court in Citizens Concerned I placed great emphasis on the testimony of psychologists, theologians, and Denver residents87-evidence considered irrelevant by the Citizens Concerned II court. Based on
such evidence, the Citizens Concerned I court concluded "that the
"that nativity scenes are seen in department stores, commercial establishments as well as in
public places to symbolize the celebration of Christmas, a national holiday" (ibid.).
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid., at 1315. See note 87.
85. Citizen.r Concerned v. Denver I, 481 F. Supp. 522 (D. Colo. 1979). For an extensive
discussion of this case, see Jonathan J. Chase, "Litigating a Nativity Scene," Saint Loui.r
Univer.rity Law Journa/24 (1980):237.
86. Citizen.r Concernedv. Denver I, 628 F.2d 1289 (lOth Cir. 1980).
87. Examples of this evidence include the following: (1) A professor of religious studies "saw
the creche as the incarnation of God in Christ, and he described Christmas symbols such as
Santa Claus, lights, trees, and others as different from the Nativity Scene because they are
decorations which are not universally Christian" (Citizen.r Conarnedv.Denver I, 481 F. Supp.
522, 526 [D. Colo. 1979}); (2) "A clinical psychologist with an expertise in child psychology
testified that in her professional opinion such a public display of apparent governmental
support of a majoritarian view has negative effects on the children in religious minority
families because it tends to encourage prejudice among the majority, and because it encourages self-degredation and diminished self-esteem among the minority" (ibid., at 526); and (3)
Letters sent to the mayor in support of the creche that included statements such as: "God and
Christ in our lives has always been what America is all about"; "We as taxpayers have a right
to express to the people that we are Christian"; and " ... if we are a Christian nation we
should do something to demonstrate that fact" (ibid., at 529). See also note 71. See Citizen.r
Concerned II, however, which cited expert testimony suggesting that "the secular and religious sides of Christmas have been intertwined throughout history and it is difficult to
separate the two"; and that "the nativity scene is being increasingly used in juxtaposition to
the secular symbols of Christmas" (Citizen.r Concernedv. Denver II, 526 F.Supp. 1310, 1313
[D. Colo. 1981]).
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City's placement of the Nativity Scene on the front steps of the
City and County Building (the very building to which the citizens must turn for government) is widely viewed as an affirmation and support of the tenets of the Christian faith." 88 In reaching this conclusion, the court in Citizens Concerned I alleged that
"the mere fact that the rest of the Christmas display is secular,
and so recognized, does not mitigate this constitutionally objectionable result. "89 The court based its approach on Supreme
Court Establishment Clause decisions holding that "aid normally
may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion
... when it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise
substantially secular setting."90
The Supreme Court's majority ruling in Lynch v. Donnelly was
quite similar to the district court decision in Citizens Concerned
II. 9l Factually, Lynch was nearly identical to Citizens Concerned.
The only real difference (which was ignored in the lower and
Supreme Court decisions) was that Pawtucket's city-owned nativity scene was displayed in a privately owned park.
The district and appellate courts in Lynch disagreed with the
Citizens Concerned II reasoning. Unlike Citizens Concerned II,
which claimed "that the nativity scene has been used sufficiently
in secular settings, and has been sufficiently integrated into our
nation's folklore that the message conveyed by its use as a symbol is ambiguous,"92 the district court in Lynch reasoned that
unlike other Christmas symbols such as a star, a bell, or a tree,
which "attains a religious dimension only if the viewer understands that it is intended to connote something more than its
facial significance . . . [the nativity scene] is more immediately
connected to the religious impact of Christmas because it is a
direct representation of the full biblical account of the birth of
Christ."93 This determination led the district court in Lynch to
apply the "remote and incidental" benefit to religion standard.
88. Citizens Concerned v. Denwr I, 481 F.Supp. 522, 529 (D. Colo. 1979).
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid., at 530.
91. See David 0. Stewart, "Taking Christ Out of Christmas?" American Bar Assodatiott
Journa/69 (December 1983):1832. For example, in addition to the creche, the Pawtucket
display "includes Santa's house, stars, Christmas trees, a model of reindeer pulling Santa's
sleigh, (etc.)" (ibid.). Additionally, "for the plaintiffs, a Methodist minister emphasized the
religious symbolism of the nativity scene, and a clinical psychologist stressed the negative
impact that [the public display of a creche] would have on non-Christian children. The city
presented a philosophy professor who specializes in religious matters. He said the nativity
scene •.. was without religious significance in such a secular setting" (ibid., at 1835).
92. Citizens Concerned v. Denver II, 526 F. Supp. 1310, 1313 (D. Colo. 1981).
93. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1167 (D.R.I. 1981).
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Also supportive of the application of a strict standard of review,
the district court concluded that the nativity scene "had not
been included for cultural or traditional reasons as an example of
how Americans celebrate the [Christmas] holiday, for it found
that no attempt had been made to disclaim any endorsement of
the religious message, and more importantly that the only religious heritage and customs acknowledged by the display were
those of the Christian majority of Pawtucket's citizenry."94
Finally, the district court, unlike Citizens Concerned II, viewed
the nativity scene in isolation rather than as part of a secular
display. For the court: "So long as the viewer possesses the
background knowledge necessary to comprehend what the symbol is meant to stand for, the symbol does not lose its power as a
communicative device simply by being taken out of its original,
or optimal, context. "95
The Lynch district court strictly applied the tripartite standard
in its invalidation of the Pawtucket display. Following guidelines established by the Supreme Court in cases like Stone, Engel,
and Schempp, (and most recently applied in Larkin v. Grendel's
Den), the lower court placed a nearly impossible burden on the
state to justify its display of a patently religious object. 96 In
affirming the district court's opinion, a divided panel of the First
Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Larson compelling state
interest-least restrictive means standard. Application of this standard was comprehensible since the Supreme Court did not clarify
in Larson whether the "compelling interest" test applied solely
to uneven regulatory interference -or whether that test extended
to uneven government benefits. 97 The first circuit held that the
test applied to uneven government benefits of the sort at issue in
Lynch, namely, the government's singling out of Christianity. 9B
The Supreme Court rejected both the appellate court's use of
the Larson standard and its ruling that the Pawtucket display
had the effect of advancing the Christian religion. Instead of
utilizing the Larson standard, the justices applied a deferential
tripartite test. At the same time, the majority explicitly recognized that the Larson standard could, on occasion, be a viable
94. Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029, 1033 (1st Cir. 1982).
95. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1167-68 (D.R.I. 1981).
96. See Fuchs, "Publicly-Funded Displays of Religious Symbols," 365-72.
97. See notes 13-15.
98. According to the court: "Larson makes clear that because the City's ownership and use
of the nativity scene is an act which discriminates between Christian and non-Christian
religions it must be evaluated under the test of strict scrutiny" (691 F.Zd 1029, 1034 [1st Cir.
1982]).
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alternative to the tripartite test. 99 The majority, however, failed
to specify when application of the Larson test is appropriate.lOO
The five-member majority then concluded that the Pawtucket
display satisfied all three prongs of the tripartite test.lOl
Setting the tone for the majority, Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger noted at the outset of his opinion that "some relationship
between government and religious organizations is inevitable"
and that the Constitution "affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility
towards any."IOZ This notion of "affirmative accommodation"
represents a retreat from the Court's previously stated view on
the purposes of the Establishment Clause.
In the 1971 school aid decision, Lemon v. Kurtzman,I03 Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the Court, contended that the tlauthors
[of the Establishment Clause] did not simply prohibit the establishment of a state church or a state religion." 104 Instead, they
sought to forestall "the three main evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection: 1sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in
religious activity."'IOS In Lynch, however, the chief justice quoted
Joseph Story to support a nearly opposite interpretation of the
Establishment Clause: "The real object of the [First] Amendment was ... to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which should give to an hierarchy the exclusive patronage
of the national government."I06 With this in mind, the Lynch's
approval of the Pawtucket display is not surprising.
The Lynch Court did not speak of the nativity scene display as
presenting a minimal risk of a state-sponsored church, however,
Instead, the Court ultimately rested 'its decision on the purportedly secular nature of the Pawtucket display. For the Court:
"The City ... has principally taken note of a significant historical religious event long celebrated in the Western World. The
creche in the display depicts the historical origins of this traditional event long recognized as a National Holiday."I07 Conse99. Lynch v. Donnelly, at 1355, 1362.
100. The majority opinion merely stated that "we are unable to see this display, or any part
of it, as explicitly discriminatory in the sense contemplated in Larson" (ibid., at 1366, n. 13).
101. Ibid., at 1365.
102. Ibid., at 1359.
103. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
104. Ibid., at 612.
105. Ibid., quoting Wa/z v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664,682 (1969).
106. Lynch v. Donnelly, at 1355, 1361, quoting Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constltution
ofthe United States (1803), 728.
107. Ibid., at 1363.
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quently, the district court view that the city display was religiously motivated since the nativity scene is pervasively religious
was rejected. 108 Instead, the Lynch majority concluded that "the
display is sponsored by the City [for legitimate secular purposes,
e.g.] to celebrate the Holiday and to depict the origins of that
Holiday. " 109
This aspect of the Court's ruling seems consistent with the
bulk of Supreme Court Establishment Clause decisions.ll 0 In
Mueller v. Allen,lll for example, the Court explicitly noted its
"reluctance to attribute unconstitutional motives to the states,
particularly when a plausible secular purpose for the state's program may be discerned from the face of the statute." ll2 Pawtucket's argument that the creche served important cultural
values as well as enhanced seasonal goodwill thus satisfies this
secular purpose requirement.
The Lynch majority also overturned the lower court finding
that the Pawtucket display had the impermissible effect of favoring or sanctioning Christian beliefs over other religious beliefs.
First, the majority rejected the district court view that the nativity scene be independently scrutinized and instead insisted that
"the focus of our inquiry must be on the creche in the context
of the Christmas season."113 The focus of this inquiry, however,
was not on the otherwise secular character of the display. Instead, the majority emphasized that all Christmas-time celebrations are rooted in religious belief. For the majority: "To forbid
the use of this one passive symbol-the creche-at the very time
people are taking note of the season with Christmas hymns and
carols in public schools and other places, and while the Congress
and Legislatures open sessions with prayers by paid chaplains
would be a stilted over-reaction contrary to our history and our
holdings." 114
Second, the Lynch majority sought to support their conclusion
by way of analogy. For example, the majority noted that the
"display of the creche is no more an advancement or endorse108. The district court in Lynch applied the analytical standard apparently approved by the
Supreme Court in Stone v. Graham, namely, that a "court [may] infer a nonsecular purpose
from government involvement with a symbol or instrument it has determined to be patently
religious" (Fuchs, "Publicly-Funded Displays of Religious Symbols," 363).
109. Lynch v. Donnelly, at 1355, 1363.
llO. But see discussion of Stone v. Graham, notes 35-37.
lll. Mueller v. Allen, at 3062 (1983).
112. Ibid., at 3066. See also Meek v. Pittenger, 4-21 U.S. 349,363 (1975); Wolman v. Walter,
433 u.s. 299,236 (1977).
113. Lynch v. Donnelly, at 1355, 1362.
114. Ibid., at 1365.
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ment of religion that the Congressional and Executive recognition of the origins of the Holiday itself as 'Christ's Mass,' or the
exhibition of literally hundreds of religious paintings in governmentally supported museums" and that "to conclude that the
primary effect of including the creche is to advance religion ...
would require that we view it as more beneficial to and more an
endorsement of religion . . . [than] expenditures of public funds
for transportation of students to church-sponsored schools" and
several other expenditures of large sums of public money to support church-sponsored .schools approved by this Court. liS These
analogies are unconvincing, however. Aid to private schools can
be couched in neutral terms (e.g., provision of secular services);
it serves a vital public function, and most importantly-extends
to secular and non-Christian sectarian private schools. Religious
paintings displayed in museums are works of art, despite their
denominational message. Finally, in regard to government recognition of Christmas day as a public holiday, "to say that
government may recognize the holiday's traditional, secular
elements of gift-giving, public festivities and community spirit,
does not mean that government may indiscriminantly embrace
the distinctively sectarian aspects of the holiday."116
Emphasizing these (and other) limitations in the majority's
analogies as well as disagreeing with the majority's conclusion
that a Christmas-time creche is a passive secular symbol, Justice
William Brennan, writing for four dissenting justices, vigorously
attacked the majority opinion. First, Justice Brennan criticized
the majority's conclusion that inclusion of the nativity scene in
the Pawtucket display served a secular purpose. For Justice
Brennan: "The nativity scene, unlike every other element of the
. .. display, reflects a sectarian exclusivity that the avowed purposes of celebrating the holiday season and promoting retail
commerce [in the downtown area surrounding the park] simply
do not encompass."ll7 On this issue, Justice Brennan's analysis
is more comprehensive than the district court, which simply
held that government involvement with a patently religious
object is a per se violation of the Establishment Clause's secular
purpose requirement.
The dissent was equally critical of the majority's conclusion
that the nativity scene display had a secular effect. According to
Justice Brennan: "I refuse to accept the notion implicit in to115. Ibid., at 1364.
116. Ibid., at 1373 Gustice Brennan dissenting).
117. Ibid.
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day's decision that non-Christians would find that the religious
content of the creche is eliminated by the fact that it appears as
part of the city's otherwise secular celebration of the Christmas
holiday."ll 8 "Those who do not share [Christian] beliefs [will
find] the symbolic reenactment of a divine being who has been
miraculously incarnated as a man stands as a dramatic reminder
of their differences with the Christian Faith.''l19
Justice Brennan was correct in insisting that the majority
should have looked at the creche in isolation-apart from both
the Christmas holidays and the otherwise secular display. As
noted in the district court opinion: "So long as the viewer possesses the background knowledge necessary to comprehend what
the symbol is meant to stand for, the symbol does not lose its
power as a communicative device simply by being taken out of
its original, or optimal, context." 120 At the same time, this "religious effect'' should be measured against contextual factors such
as the seasonal nature of the display and the relationship of the
creche to other objects in the display. In in any event, the pervasively religious nature of the nativity scene combined with the
fact that Pawtucket included no other religious symbols in the
display clearly suggests that the overall effect of the display was
the impermissible advancement of religion.
Finally, the Brennan dissent pointed to possible future entanglements between government and religion that might be the
consequence of the majority ruling: "Jews and other non-Christian groups, prompted [in Pawtucket] by the Mayor's remark
that he will include a Menorah in future displays, can be expected to press government for inclusion of their symbols, and
faced with such requests, government will have to become in118. Ibid., at 1377 Gustice Brennan dissenting).
119. Ibid., Justice Brennan further noted: "For Christians, of course, the essential message of the nativity is that God became incarnate in the person of Christ. But just as
fundamental to Jewish thought is the belief in the 'non-incarnation of God.... [t]he
God in whom Uews] believe, to whom Uews] are pledged, does not unite with human
substance on earth.' Martin Buber, Israel and the World (1948) (reprinted in F. Talmadge, Disputation and Dialogue: Readings in the Jewish-Christian Encounter 281-282
(1975)). This distinction, according to Buber, 'constitute[s] the ultimate division between
Judaism and Christianity.' Ibid., at 281. See also R. Ruether, Faith and Fratricide 246
(1974). Similarly, those who follow the tenets of Unitarianism might well find Pawtucket's support for the symbolism of the creche, which highlights the trinitarian tradition in Christian faith, to be an affront to their belief in a single divine being. See J.
Williams, What Americans Believe and How They Worship 316-317 (3d ed. 1969). See
also C. Olmstead, History of Religion in the United States 296-299 (1960)" (ibid., at
1377, n. 14).
120. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1167-68.
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volved in accommodating the various demands."l21
The Brennan dissent is a stronger, more comprehensive,
argument than that proffered by the Burger majority. Unlike
other symbols, the nativity scene's secular value cannot be readily divorced from its religious significance. Consequently, government should make special efforts to "secularize" such a display. Exemplary of such special efforts were actions taken by the
federal government in Allen v. Morton.
Admittedly, the issue raised in Lynch calls into play both the
religious heritage of the American people and the antimajoritarian principles of the Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court has recognized the centrality of both values. In the case of an identifiable pervasively religious symbol, however, the balance must be
struck in favor of the Bill of Rights. As the district court in
Lynch noted: "We cannot have it both ways-a government that
scrupulously honors each person's freedom of belief and yet publicly aligns itself with one particular set of beliefs. The endorsement of one is a disparagement of others that were not chosen,
and it becomes increasingly difficult to accord equal respect to
what has been publicly marked as less worthy."l22
In addition to this substantive ruling, the Supreme Court's
Lynch decision is deficient for its failure to clarify analytical
standards in Establishment Clause lawsuits. Instead of specifying
the circumstances in which any of the three ((approved" standards of review in Establishment Clause cases should be utilized,
the Court merely acknowledged that there were, in fact, three
viable standards of review.l23 As mentioned, the Court did not
even bother to specify why the first circuit was wrong in applying the Larson test.
This inconclusiveness was noted by Justice Brennan who understandably remarked: "It seems the Court is willing to alter its
analysis from Term to Term in order to suit its preferred results." 124
At the same time, the tenor of the Burger opinion is indicative of
what probably will happen in future Establishment Clause decisions. First, the Court seems more-or-less committed to make use of
the tripartite test. Although its comment concerning the inapplicability of Larson is opaque, the Court's failure to utilize that standard
121. Lynch v. Donnelly, at 1355, 1374 Uustice Brennan dissenting).
122. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1180-81.
123. Lynchv.Donnelly,at 1355,1362. "[Although]we have often found it useful[toapply the
tripartite test) ... we have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any
single test of criterion in this sensitive area."
124. Ibid., at 1372, n. 4, 1373 Uustice Brennan dissenting).
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in an uneven benefit case like Lynch 125 suggests that the compelling
interest-least restrictive means test will only be used in uneven
regulatory interference cases. Similarly, the majority's failure to
extend the Marsh historical exemption into a more general cultural
or traditional exception suggests that the Marsh standard is limited
to practices whose origin can be traced to the First Congress.126
The language in Lynch is also suggestive of how the Court will
utilize the tripartite test. The Lynch Court's changes in perspective
as to the meaning of the Establishment Clause 127 and its emphasis
on acceptable government interfaces with religion 128 suggest that
the Court will be deferential in its applications of the tripartite test.
This conclusion is buttressed by two of the three 1982-83 term
Establishment Clause decisions, Mueller v. Allen and Marsh v.
Chambers. 129 The other 1982-83 term decision, Larkin v. Grendel's
Den, can be distinguished from these other rulings since government vested rule-making authority in religious institutions. 130
Apparently, Lynch supports the trend set by the previous term's
rulings, namely, that government may benefit religion in an even or
uneven manner providedthat such government benefits do not limit
the government's rule-making authority.
To many, the days of strict separation between church and state
may now seem past. This may provide both benefits and disadvantages. On the positive side, there is much truth to the contentions
that in a complex society, government and religious organizations
will have contact with each other in myriad ways. Additionally, the
government should be able to permit Medicaid and Medicare benefits to patients at church-affiliated hospitals, to advance the goal of
equal education opportunity by permitting disadvantaged students
attending private schools to share in federal aid to education programs, and to provide funds to church-related universities to conduct medical and scientific research. Put simply: Society should not
become so secularized as to exclude any reference to religion.
Finally, America's religious heritage need not be totally ignored by
the secular government. Lynch clearly recognizes that church and
state cannot and should not be absolutely separated.
125. Lynch is arguably an uneven benefits case. Justice Brennan, for example, noted in his
dissent that "Pawtucket itself owns the creche and instead of extending similar attention to a
'broad spectrum' of religious and secular groups, it has singled out Christianity for special
treatment" (ibid., at 1374 Uustice Brennan dissenting]). See also notes 13-15.
126. See ibid., at 1370, n. 1 Oustice Brennan dissenting}.
127. See notes 104-7.
128. See notes ll5-52.
129. See notes 8-12, 17-21.
130. See notes 22-25.
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At the same time, government moneys or government support of
one particular kind of religious belief might be the principal evil that
the Establishment Clause sought to forestall. School prayer and
public-funded displays of the cross or the nativity scene are examples
of such nonpermissible government support of a particular kind of
religious belief. Lynch, thus, poses the danger of permitting the sort
of church-state entanglements that will alienate individuals subscribing to minority religious views.
All in all, it is hard to assess whether society is better off with an
overly strict or overly deferential interpretation of what constitutes
an establishment of religion. It is unfortunate, however, that the
Supreme Court has never been able to recognize simultaneously the
centrality of both separation and accommodation.

